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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rhonda Atkins poured her heart out when she testified to Congress, in the 
summer of 2004, about her concerns that this country faces in combating the 
problem of obtaining the necessary treatment for mentally ill offenders.  This 
problem is especially close to her heart because her daughter Reese was diagnosed 
with bipolar disorder, a severe mental disorder, when she was fifteen years old.1  For 
years, Reese’s conditions went untreated and she began to slowly deteriorate.  Reese 
tried to control her conditions by abusing various substances, like so many other 
individuals suffering from mental illnesses.  Reese’s behavior would range from 
severe mania, to extreme irrationality, to paranoia.  When her daughter’s behavior 
became uncontrollable, Rhonda’s only resource was to call the police.2  
Through the countless times that the police were called to her residence because 
of her daughter’s behavior, some police officers were compassionate to her illness, 
while others were rough. Sometimes, the officers escalated Reese’s conditions where 
she or the officers could have been injured.  One officer stated, “if you were my 
daughter, I would knock you across the room.”3  The officer’s behavior exemplifies 
the growing problem that the criminal justice system is ill-equipped to properly 
handle mentally ill offenders.  
At the time of Reese’s first arrest for trespassing, there were no resources  
available to give her daughter the necessary treatment she required.  Even after she 
was later diverted into a drug court, following a drug charge, her daughter was still 
                                                                
1Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing on S.1174 
Before the Comm. on Senate Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Rhonda Atkins, 
mother of a mentally ill offender) [hereinafter “Atkins, Statement”]. 
2Id. 
3Id. 
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left without the necessary treatment.  One social worker even discouraged the 
integration of substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment.4  The reality of 
Reese Atkins is a sad but true story.  The Atkins family is not alone in this fight.  
Beginning in the early 1950s and ‘60s, states began to close their public mental 
health hospitals. This process was known as “deinstitutionalization.” In recent years, 
following the massive wave of deinstitutionalization, a substantial number of 
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities were relocated from civil mental 
hospitals into jails and prisons.5  Despite this shift in population, correctional 
facilities remain ill-equipped to handle and deal with offenders with mental 
disabilities. One study found that approximately 6.5-10% of inmates suffered from a 
serious mental illness, while another 15-40% suffered from a moderate mental 
illness.6  Another study done by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicated that 16% or 
an estimated 283,800 inmates were identified as being mentally ill by mid-year 
1998.7  Cheri Nolan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Justice 
Programs, testified to Congress that “the increasing number of people with mental 
illnesses in the criminal justice system is one of the most pressing issues facing our 
police departments, jails, prisons, and courts.8”   
Despite such statistics, offenders’ rights to mental health treatment have been 
slow to reach many of incarcerated inmates who require treatment.  The landmark 
case of Estelle v. Gamble9 and its modern predecessors have only reactively 
                                                                
4Id. 
5TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 13 (ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN ed., 
1998). 
6Paula M. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 1999).  Statistics gathered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicated that 
mentally ill offenders are more likely to commit violent offenses; more likely to report three or 
more prior offenses; more likely to be violent recidivists; and more likely to have been 
homeless in the time prior to their current incarceration.  Mentally ill offenders are also more 
likely to report higher rates of alcohol and drug abuse, prior physical and sexual abuse, and 
more likely to have a family history of incarceration, when compared to those who are not 
mentally ill.  
7Allen J. Beck & Laura M. Maruschak, Mental Health Treatment in State Prisons, 2000 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001).  The study indicated of the facilities that housed state 
prisoners, seventy percent reported that they screened inmates at intake; 65% conducted 
psychiatric assessments; 51% provided twenty-four hour mental health care; 71% provided 
therapy or counseling to their inmates by trained mental health professionals; 73% distributed 
psychotropic medications; and 66% of the facilities helped to obtain community mental health 
treatment upon the inmates’ release from the facility. 
8Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing on S.1174 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Cheri Nolan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
of the Office of Justice Programs). In the Fiscal Year 2003 appropriation, the BJA received 
grants totaling $5.5 million for mental health courts for thirty-seven jurisdictions located in 
twenty-nine different states. Each site received a two-year grant worth about $150,000 total, 
have help launch these newly developed mental health courts and have helped mental health 
courts already in place to update and add key components to their existing mental health 
courts.   
9Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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addressed the egregious actions of correctional facilities that deny mentally ill 
offenders the proper mental health care treatments. The United States Supreme Court 
formulated the appropriate test in Estelle, concluding “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain’ that violates the Eighth Amendment.”10  Such a standard makes it difficult 
for inmates to receive the necessary treatment they require, or to prove that current 
treatment is inadequate.  The courts have said for years what the constitutional 
minimums were concerning rights to mental health treatment.  If the courts were to 
raise such minimums to allow for greater access to treatment, or uniformly apply the 
standards used by many proactive correctional facilities, mental health professionals 
could possibly treat the mental illnesses that may have inevitably led to the vast 
majority of mentally ill offenders’ current incarceration.  
With the signing into law of The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime 
Reduction Act of 2004, government agencies and health care providers will now be 
able to act more proactively in attempting to reduce the amount of crime committed 
by mentally ill individuals. But only time will tell how such legislation will help 
combat the problem of the inadequacy of mental health treatment that mentally ill 
offenders receive while incarcerated.  This Note will examine the evolution of health 
care rights that incarcerated persons are afforded, specifically looking at the rights to 
mental heath treatment.  Through this process, the many problems will be illustrated 
that this issue creates, and look towards the future at what could be done by 
examining what currently works and what is still needed to alleviate the problem of 
mentally ill offenders.   
II. DUTY TO PROVIDE OR THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
Under the common law, a private hospital had no obligation to provide medical 
treatment, regardless of whether there existed an emergency.11  This absence of duty 
followed from the common law tort principle that a person had no duty to help 
another in peril, absent a special relationship.  At common law, physicians had no 
affirmative duty to accept a particular patient for the purposes of treatment.12 
However, once a physician chose to treat a patient, the physician was then under a 
legal obligation to provide continuous necessary medical treatment until their 
physician-patient relationship had been terminated.13 
As discussed above, early common law principles placed no affirmative duty 
upon the state to provide medical care to those in need, or at least made it difficult to 
obtain the care needed. Modern rights to health care have emerged via the Federal 
Constitution. The question of whether there is a constitutional right to health care lies 
in the debated cases that deal with the funding of abortions. In Harris v. McRae and 
Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court held that the government is not obligated to 
                                                                
10Id. at 104. 
11Hill v. Ohio County, 468 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1970). 
12See Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
13See Annotation, Liability of Physician Who Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R.2d 432, 435 
(1958). 
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provide for such services.14 The Court drew the distinction between a duty to provide 
necessary medical care or treatment and the impeded access to such medical services 
as a result of state action.15 Relying on the above cases, the Eleventh Circuit has held 
that individuals do not have a general constitutional right to medical care or 
treatment provided by the state,16 but there are exceptions when a special relationship 
exists between the state and the patient.    
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT THE STATE HAS NO DUTY TO PROVIDE 
HEALTH CARE: PERSONS UNDER STATE CUSTODY 
The modern principle that draws an inference of the state’s duty to provide those 
individuals under its control or custody with the necessary medical care is known as 
the DeShaney principle.17  The Supreme Court held that the state had no affirmative 
duty to protect a child from the abuse of his father.18  Simply stated, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to affirmatively protect 
the life, liberty, or property of a citizen, regardless of how severe or detrimental 
those actions taken by private citizens may be. The Fourteenth Amendment provides 
a blanket of protection for citizens only against the egregious actions of the state, not 
the actions of private citizens.19   
The Supreme Court has stated that an exception to the general rule exists only 
when a special custodial or other relationship exists between the government and the 
individual seeking medical care.20  Constitutional violations may arise when the 
                                                                
14See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 
(1977).  
15Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital, Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 
1987). The plaintiff was four months pregnant when she was ordered by her obstetrician to 
come immediately to Piedmont hospital. After she called 911, the ambulance arrived and she 
told them to take her to Piedmont, but instead she was taken to Shallowford Community 
Hospital. After a substantial delay, the plaintiff was transferred to Peidmont, but she gave birth 
to a premature baby boy who only survived for a mere four hours. The court held that her 
claim failed, because there is no constitutional right to medical care or treatment provided by 
the state or municipality.  
16Id. at 1034-36.  
17DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). A minor 
child, through his guardian ad litem filed suit against the Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services for failing to protect the child from the abuse of his father. The department 
was contacted for the alleged abuse but after several hearings, there was insufficient evidence 
to remove the child from his father’s custody.  Even after several trips to the emergency room 
and various suspicious bruises on the child, the department took no action. Finally, several 
years after the first instances, the child’s father beat him so horrifically, the child was left brain 
damaged and expected to live the rest of his life in an institution as a result of his profound 
retardation. Id. at 191-93. 
18Id. at 202. 
19Id. at 196. 
20See Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1034. 
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government fails to provide the necessary medical services when a special 
relationship exists.21  
This custodial relationship arises when the government exercises a significant 
degree of custody or control over a person, and the government’s isolation of the 
person places him in a worse situation than he would have been had the government 
failed to act.22  Such situations exist when the state places an individual in a position 
of vulnerability, effectively stripping that person of his ability to defend himself, or 
denying him sources of aid.23  In recent years, the Court has stated that such special 
or custodial relationships that create a duty for the state to provide medical care 
include the following: incarcerated persons;24 involuntarily committed mental 
patients;25 pretrial detainees;26 persons injured while being apprehended by police;27 
and children placed in foster care.28  The above examples illustrate situations in 
which the state exercises a substantial degree of custody or control over such 
persons, therefore, creating a constitutional duty to provide the necessary medical 
care.  
Absent such a duty by the state to provide for certain medical treatments or 
services, how can individuals under the state’s control obtain the necessary medical 
care that they ultimately require? Just as parents are expected to provide their 
children with the proper and necessary medical care, so too should the state provide 
those individuals under its control with the necessary medical care.   
A. Rights to Health Care for Children in State Custody 
The government has a constitutional duty to provide medical care through 
custodial relationships such as foster care.29  In Taylor v. Ledbetter, Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit held that the foster child stated a cause of action for the 
physical injuries suffered as a result of placement in an abusive foster home, caused 
by the government’s gross negligence and deliberate indifference in placing the child 
there.30  The court held that the situation of a child being involuntarily placed in a 
foster home is so analogous to a prisoner being placed in a correctional institution 
                                                                
21Id. 
22Id. at 1035. 
23See Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507, 511 (7th Cir. 1989). 
24See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-103. 
25See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). 
26See, e.g., Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th  Cir. 1985). 
27See, e.g., City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983); 
Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d. 1408, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986) (“the due process clause 
requires responsible governments and their agents to secure medical care doe persons who 
have been injured while in police custody”). 
28See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 820-21 (11th Cir. 1987). 
29Id. 
30Id. at 816. 
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that the foster child may bring a Section 1983 action for violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.31 
B. Rights to Health Care for Persons in Mental Institutions 
Persons in mental institutions have a substantive due process right to receive 
necessary medical treatment.32  In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court 
recognized the existence of certain protected rights to one’s liberty that apply to 
persons confined in state institutions with mental illnesses.33  When the state acts to 
restrict a person’s freedom of his own actions, by means of institutionalization or 
other restraints of personal liberty, the state then creates a duty in protecting that 
person from harm.34  The Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment establishes an affirmative duty upon the state to provide involuntarily 
committed mentally ill patients with the necessary services that will ensure the 
patients’ safety from themselves and others.  The state “may not restrain residents 
except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure 
such safety or to provide needed training.”35  The Court stated that medical care is an 
essential service that the state is obligated to provide to its mentally ill patients who 
are confined in its state mental health institutions.36  
C. Rights to Health Care for Prison Inmates, Pretrial Detainees, and Arrestees 
In the last half of the century, emerging case law has established that correctional 
facilities have a constitutional duty to provide some level of medical care to its 
inmates.37  The question remained as to what level of medical care was required.  
Such medical care that was required included reasonable medical assistance to 
inmates, which would include a medical examination, access to sick call, dental care, 
and suicide prevention.38  Medical care should also be provided when such 
deprivation of medical treatment would immediately threaten an inmate’s life or 
limb.39  Earlier case law established the foundation to inmates’ access to receive 
medical treatment.  There were considerable amounts of disagreements between the 
courts concerning the specific basis for these rights to medical care and treatment.40  
It was not until the end of the twentieth century that the Supreme Court held what the 
constitutional justification was, and where it came from.   
                                                                
31Id.; see also Wideman, 826 F.2d at 1035. 
32Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 307. 
33Id.  
34DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189. 
35Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. 
36Id.  
37Carl T. Drechsler, Annotation, Relief Under Federal Civil Rights Acts to State Prisoners 
Complaining of Denial of Medical Care, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 279 (2005). 
38Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 277 (D. Md. 1972) (stating that “the Jail is 
constitutionally required ‘to provide reasonable medical assistance to inmates’”). 
39Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972). 
40Drechsler, supra note 37. 
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The principle established in DeShaney, which creates limited situations when a 
state has an affirmative duty to protect and care for individuals, applies not only to 
mental institutions, but also to jails and prisons.41  The Court in Deshaney stated, 
“when the State takes the person into its custody and holds him there against his will, 
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility 
for his safety and general well-being.”42  This duty is created when the person or 
inmate is rendered helpless, isolated from the necessary care that may be needed.43  
The state is responsible for the inmate’s helplessness; therefore, the state has a duty 
to care for the inmate while in its custody.44  
A jailer owes a duty to the prisoners to keep them safe, to protect them from 
unnecessary harm, and to exercise reasonable care for their lives and their health.45 
State government subdivisions that are responsible for the operation of local jails 
have a legal obligation to supply needed medical treatment, and local jails are 
subjected to the same deliberate indifference standards as state and federal prisons.46 
Even though the Eighth Amendment does not come into play until a person is 
convicted, pretrial detainees and arrestees may enjoy the same constitutional rights to 
medical care that are afforded to convicted prisoners.47  
IV. THE LANDMARK DECISION OF ESTELLE V. GAMBLE: INMATES ACCESS TO HEALTH 
CARE  
The leading case that established the test for determining when an inmate’s right 
to medical care had been violated is Estelle v. Gamble. Estelle established the 
constitutional right of prisoners to adequate medical care and treatment.  The Court 
established that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates 
the Eighth Amendment and its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.48  
The plaintiff, J.W. Gamble, was an inmate of the Texas Department of 
Corrections.49  While Gamble was performing a prison work assignment, a bale of 
cotton fell on him.50  Gamble was later admitted to the prison hospital after the pain 
grew extremely intense.51  The next day, Gamble’s injury was diagnosed as a back 
                                                                
41DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198. 
42Id. at 200. 
43Id. 
44Id. 
45See State of Miss. for Use of Derrow v. Durham, 444 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1971). 
46See Lutheran Med. Ctr. of Omaha v. City of Omaha, 281 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Neb. 
1988); see also Starbeck v. Linn County Jail, 871 F. Supp. 1129, 1141 (N.D. Iowa 1994) 
(stating “A medical need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize 
the necessity for a doctor's attention”).  
47See City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 239. 
48Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. 
49Id. at 98. 
50Id. at 99. 
51Id. 
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strain, and he was given a cell-pass that allowed him to refrain from his work 
duties.52  Another doctor then prescribed him additional medications for his high 
blood pressure and continued back pain.53  Because Gamble refused to work on 
several occasions, he was twice brought before the prison disciplinary committee.  
Subsequent to the second hearing, Gamble was placed in solitary confinement.54  
While in solitary confinement, Gamble complained of chest pains and black outs, 
but it was not until the fourth day that a medical assistant ordered him to be 
hospitalized.55  The next day, a doctor prescribed him medication, but a few days 
later, Gamble continued to complain of chest, arm, and back pains.56  Initially, the 
prison guards refused to allow Gamble to see the doctor, but after a few days, he was 
allowed access to one of the prison’s medical staff.  Gamble formed his complaint 
pursuant to Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that he was subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.   
The Court’s reasoning in Estelle centered on the idea that the Eighth Amendment 
demands that incarcerated persons receive the basic human needs and protection 
from inadequate living conditions.  In years preceding Estelle, the Supreme Court 
had stated that the Eighth Amendment proscribes more than just “physically 
barbarous punishments.”57  The Eighth Amendment embodies the basic concepts of 
dignity, humanity, and decency that infers a civilized standard that this country’s 
penal system must be measured against.  The early principles of the Eighth 
Amendment established that the government had an obligation to provide the 
necessary medical care to inmates who were punished through means of 
incarceration.58  
The government is responsible for the inmates’ medical needs because the 
inmates are isolated from the outside world; therefore, they are unable to seek the 
necessary medical treatment on their own.59  The government fails to alleviate their 
medical conditions when it fails to provide the inmates with the necessary medical 
treatment, and such inaction becomes analogous with actual physical torture.  The 
Eighth Amendment seeks to prohibit such physical torture.60  In instances that are 
less serious, but nonetheless, create suffering for an inmate through such denial of 
medical care, the government could hardly argue that this suffering serves any 
                                                                
52Id. at 100.  For the next several weeks, Gamble took prescribed pain medications to ease 
the pain. Despite the continued pain, the doctor took away his cell-pass, which restored him to 
his full work duties, even though Gamble refused to work.  
53Id. 
54Id. at 100-101. 
55Id. at 101. 
56Id. 
57Id. at 102; see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1796); Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
58Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-104. 
59Id. 
60Id. 
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legitimate penological purpose.61  Therefore, the government demonstrates deliberate 
indifference to the inmates’ serious medical needs when it fails to provide inmates 
with the necessary medical treatment, thus amounting to unnecessary and wanton 
pain onto an inmate.62  
The essential test formulated in Estelle consists of two elements – deliberate 
indifference and the inmates’ serious medical needs – that must be found to exist for 
an inmate or class of inmates to show such denial of medical care violated their 
Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.  
A. The Deliberate Indifference and Serious Medical Needs Test 
The Court in Estelle formulated the deliberate indifference test.  The Court stated 
that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.63  This test is made up of 
two components, the first one being that prison officials exhibit deliberate 
indifference, and the second being the inmate complaining of a serious medical need.  
Deliberate indifference may be manifested by any of the correctional facility’s 
staff.64  This includes the doctor’s response to the inmate’s medical needs, or by the 
correctional officers’ intentional denial or delay of the necessary medical care.65  
Prison officials exhibit deliberate indifference when there is a substantial risk of 
serious harm to an inmate’s safety or health, and the official knows of or disregards 
such a substantial risk.66  Under the deliberate indifference standard, an inmate must 
show that the correctional facility’s inaction caused an unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain, and the prison officials willfully disregarded this need with 
specific knowledge that such treatment was necessary.67  Deliberate indifference is 
not established by the mere allegation of inadequate medical care received by the 
inmate,68 as the inmate in Estelle argued.  Furthermore, accidents alone, do not 
establish deliberate indifference, nor does a physician’s negligence to treat an 
inmate.69  
Prison or jail officials may exhibit deliberate indifference based upon their 
particular knowledge of certain risks to certain inmates.70  Certain risks or situations 
include: suicidal tendencies,71 withholding of medication for a serious medical 
                                                                
61Id. 
62Id. at 104. 
63Id. 
64Id. at 104-05. 
65Id. 
66Id. at 105. 
67Id. at 104-05. 
68Id. 
69Id. 
70See, e.g., Sauders v. City of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ind. 1998). 
71Id. 
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condition,72 failure to promptly and reasonably procure competent medical aid for a 
serious illness or injury,73 intentionally denying or delaying prescribed medical 
treatment,74 or the failure to allow inmates to make their medical problems known to 
the prison’s medical staff.75  Even though the prison or jail official may have been 
deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s medical needs, if the medical need is not 
serious, liability may be precluded.76 
A serious medical need that would support an Eighth Amendment claim for 
deliberate indifference arises where the failure to treat the prisoners’ conditions 
could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.77  A serious medical need exists: when a reasonable doctor or individual would 
find a particular injury important and worthy of treatment or complaint; where a 
medical condition significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or when 
chronic and substantial pain indicates that a individual has a serious need for medical 
treatment.78  Other situations that manifest serious medical needs are: when an 
inmate has been diagnosed as having a condition that mandates treatment;79 
conditions that even a lay person would recognize as requiring medical attention,80 or 
Hepatitis C.81  Courts may determine whether or not the medical needs of the inmates 
rises to the level of “serious” by drawing a legal conclusion from the established 
facts of each case.82  
Courts apply the deliberate indifference test of Estelle when an inmate complains 
of or suffers from an untreated illness.  This Note will look at how the courts go from 
protecting inmates who not only suffer from physical illnesses, but those who suffer 
from mental illnesses as well.  Just as inmates fought for their right to receive 
                                                                
72See, e.g., Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 
966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995). 
73See Shannon v. Lester, 519 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[a] person detained in custody 
is entitled to medical treatment when necessary on account of illness or injury”); see also City 
of Revere, 463 U.S. at 239 (holding that the Due Process Clause requires the responsible 
government agency to provide the necessary medical care to individuals injured while they 
were being apprehended by police); Maddox, 792 F.2d at 1415.  
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adequate medical treatment and care for their physical ailments, so too will they have 
to fight for their rights to receive mental health treatment and care while they are 
incarcerated.  Just as inmates once had no proclaimed rights to medical care while 
incarcerated, involuntarily committed mental patients had no express rights to mental 
health treatment while they were institutionalized.  Statistics show that a vast 
majority of incarcerated offenders in this country suffer from some form of mental 
illness.  Before exploring the current structure of mental health care in prisons and 
jails, the emergence of mental health care in state mental hospitals will be examined 
V. RIGHTS TO MENTAL HEALTH CARE TREATMENT 
Before the middle of the Twentieth century, persons suffering from mental 
illnesses who were committed to mental hospitals had no express right to treatment 
while they were institutionalized.  In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court 
recognized the existence of certain protected rights to one’s liberty that apply to 
persons confined in state institutions for persons with mental illnesses.  The Court 
recognized that when an individual is completely dependent on the state, through his 
involuntary confinement in the state mental institution, an affirmative duty is then 
created for the state to provide certain necessary services to the individuals, which 
would include mental health care and treatment.  Courts across the country would 
soon realize that just as it is unjust to deny involuntarily committed persons in 
mental institutions the required mental health treatment, so too is it to deny those 
persons incarcerated in local jails and prisons.  
A. Rights to Mental Health Care in State Treatment Facilities 
In 1966, Rouse v. Cameron became the first decision that conceptualized a right 
to treatment or habilitation as the logical quid pro quo for allowing the State to 
involuntary confine someone who was mentally ill.83  This right was not absolute by 
any means of the imagination.  The court in O’Connor v. Donaldson held that merely 
warehousing residents was unconstitutional,84 and a non-dangerous person could not 
be confined in an institution if a family or community resource was available for that 
person to live safely in the community.85  However, the Court in O’Connor 
specifically stated that they would not answer as to whether there was a right to 
treatment for those posing a danger to themselves or others involuntarily committed 
by the state.86  The court in Zinermon v. Burch reasoned that the state must also find 
some level of dangerousness to himself or others to initiate or sustain involuntary 
institutionalization.87  
Once a person is confined in a state mental institution, the question then becomes 
what constitutional protections or rights to care and treatment is the individual 
                                                                
83Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1966), rev’d on other grounds. 
84O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975). Prior to the plaintiff’s lawsuit, it 
was debatable as to whether or not Florida law provided an affirmative right to treatment for 
involuntarily committed persons, but years later, Florida law enacted a statutory duty upon the 
state to provide treatment.  
85Id. 
86Id. at 573. 
87See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 (1990). 
2004-05] THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 119 
afforded.  Justice Stewart stated in O’Connor that a full right to treatment was 
premature for those confined involuntary, but the decision did not preclude this.88 In 
Youngberg v. Romeo, the state involuntarily placed the individual in a Pennsylvania 
State mental institution after his mother was unable to care for her twenty-six year 
old son who suffered from mental retardation.89  The boy’s mother filed suit against 
the institution after noticing her son had suffered from several injuries while he was 
confined.90  The complaint alleged that he had sustained injuries on at least sixty-
three instances as a result of his own aggressive behavior and the reactions of the 
other residents to his initial behaviors.91 
In Youngberg, the Court recognized that when an individual, as it was shown 
here, is completely dependent on the state through his involuntary confinement in the 
state mental institution, an affirmative duty is then created for the State to provide 
certain necessary services to the individuals.92  The Court went on to say that such 
services include minimally adequate or reasonable training for the individual so that 
he may protect himself from undue restraint or harm that he may inflict upon himself 
or others.93 
Youngberg also announced the prevailing professional standards of care 
articulated in Chief Judge Seitz’s concurring opinion in the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
decision.94  There, the Court stated that the constitutional and federal civil rights of 
institutionalized persons were to be judged by a reasonable exercise of professional 
judgment.95  The Court emphasized “that courts must show deference to the 
judgment exercised by a qualified professional, [and] . . . there certainly is no reason 
to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making 
such decisions.”96  The professional judgment standard is the primary consideration 
in most right to treatment cases, and theories are limited to those in state custody.97  
The minimum requirements that states must provide include: (1) the necessities of 
life; (2) a reasonably safe living condition; (3) the freedom from undue restraints; 
and (4) such minimally adequate training needed to enhance or further the residents’ 
ability to exercise their constitutional rights (i.e. safety within the institution).98 
Mentally ill persons cannot simply be placed into an institution without the proper 
mental health treatment.  
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As Youngberg opened the door to affirmative mental health treatment to those 
involuntarily confined in state mental institutions, the decision would eventually lead 
to inmates’ right to receive mental health treatment as well.  Like mentally ill 
patients who were institutionalized, inmates who suffer from mental illnesses also 
have a right to such treatment.  Just as it was unjust to confine persons in mental 
institutions and deny them the very treatment that they need, so too is it to deny 
mentally ill offenders who are incarcerated in a correctional facility. 
B. Rights to Mental Health Care in Correctional Facilities 
As earlier cases established the duty on the State to provide the necessary 
medical care to inmates in its custody, Ramos v. Lamm stated that such medical care 
that states are to provide includes care for physical ills, dental care, and 
psychological or psychiatric care.99  The requirement to provide inmates with 
adequate mental health care stems from the obligation of the correctional facility to 
provide inmates with basic human needs.100  The deliberate indifference test 
established in Estelle v. Gamble is equally applicable to assessing whether or not the 
treating of psychological or psychiatric ailments in a correctional facility was 
constitutionally sufficient.101  
If an inmate’s mental health is sufficiently serious, such denial of psychiatric or 
mental health care may constitute a violation of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment 
rights against cruel and unusual punishment,102 just as if he was denied access to 
basic medical treatment. Inmates do not have a right to the best possible mental 
health care, but merely reasonable care in accordance with the state’s minimum 
standards of mental health treatment.103  Such inadequate care does not exist when 
the inmates do not allege a deprivation that was sufficiently serious that required 
urgent care, such that would result in “death, degeneration or extreme pain.”104 
The burden of proof that inmates must overcome is high to successfully 
challenge these constitutional rights, and to prevail, the mental health care must be 
extraordinarily inadequate.105  An inmate’s refusal to cooperate with prison 
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psychologists is a factor that may preclude a claim that prison officials were 
deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs.106  
The Court has held that inmates have a right to treatment for their serious injuries 
or illnesses that require medical care, otherwise known as their serious medical 
needs.107  Denial of psychiatric or mental health care, if sufficiently serious, may 
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.108  Various serious medical needs 
include: acute depression;109 paranoid schizophrenia;110 nervous collapse;111 
transsexualism;112 and other severe mental disturbances.113  Such general situations 
that may constitute serious medical needs include: an injury that a reasonable doctor 
or patient would find important and worthy of treatment or commitment;114 the 
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 
activities;115 and the existence of chronic and substantial pain.116  
To further define what psychological or psychiatric care that an inmate is 
entitled, courts have reverted to the Fourth Circuit’s discussion in Bowring v. 
Godwin.117  The court stated that prison inmates have a limited right to psychiatric 
and psychological treatment if a mental health care provider, while exercising 
ordinary skill and care, concludes with reasonable medical certainty that such 
treatment is medically necessary to the inmates’ well-being and not merely desirable 
by the inmates.118  A prison inmate is entitled to psychological or psychiatric 
treatment if a physician or health care provider, exercising ordinary care at the time 
of observation, concludes with reasonable certainty that: (1) the inmate’s symptoms 
demonstrate a serious disease or injury; (2) the disease or injury is curable or may be 
substantially alleviated as a result of necessary treatment; and (3) the potential for 
harm to the inmate through unnecessary delay or ultimate denial of care would be 
substantial to the inmate’s health.119  Prisoners do not have a right to state-provided 
psychiatric treatment, absent a reliable medical diagnosis of a serious mental illness 
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that can be alleviated symptomatically for some known treatment.120  Therefore, an 
inference may be drawn that inmates are entitled to treatment for illnesses that are 
known to be curable, or a level of treatment that alleviates some minimal level of 
pain.121  Also, the importance of diagnosis or access to being diagnosed seems to be 
an important element in this constitutional debate.  What happens when inmates are 
not diagnosed properly or not diagnosed at all?  How can they seek the appropriate 
treatment they need?  
The court in Bowring contradicted the Estelle deliberate indifference standard 
when it stated, “[t]he right to treatment is, of course, limited to that which may be 
provided upon a reasonable cost and time basis and the essential test is one of 
medical necessity and not simply that which may be considered merely desirable.”122  
This begs the question, as to which factor the Court considers the most important 
factor: the cost factor or the medical necessity factor? Does the inmate’s medical 
necessity yield to the government’s fiscal responsibilities, or does the inmate’s health 
trump financial considerations? Or as an alternative analysis, are they equally 
important considerations? 
Under this analysis, the Court would allow correctional officials to use cost 
considerations in determining the appropriate level of treatment afforded to the 
inmates.123  Such discretion may allow the correctional officials to determine the 
constitutional rights to treatment, instead of the judiciary, the legislature, or a mental 
health professional.124  The general Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not look 
to cost considerations when evaluating inmates’ Eighth Amendment claims. 
The question then becomes what is the purpose behind the Court’s statement.  
Was the Court narrowing the Estelle standard even more, or was this merely dicta 
that future courts may use when faced with outrageous requests for medical 
treatment, whether for physical or mental ills?  Some light has been shed on this 
discussion by a United States District Court in Virginia.  In a footnote, the court 
stated that decisions involving cost considerations only become deliberately 
indifferent when the decision is based solely on the cost, rather than any medical 
rationale.125  
The medical professional judgment standard articulated in Bowring gives 
discretion to medical professionals who ultimately determine the level of treatment 
that an inmate may receive.  Some critics argue that once the treatment is deemed 
necessary for an inmate, the least expensive treatment should be afforded to the 
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inmate, thus conserving governmental resources.126  This is possible because the 
medical staff personnel are the ones prescribing the appropriate treatments, not the 
correctional officials.127  When such medical personnel are employed by the 
government, they have an even greater incentive to choose the least expensive 
treatment.128  In the end, medical staff and correctional facilities are universally 
inadequate for providing even the minimally adequate care that is necessary to treat 
certain illnesses, and they are likely to choose the easiest and least expensive 
treatments.129 
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court narrowed the deliberate indifference 
standard of Estelle.130  The plaintiff, Dee Farmer, was diagnosed by the Bureau of 
Prisons as suffering from a rare psychiatric disorder known as transsexualism.131  
Farmer typically wore women’s clothing and displayed feminine characteristics.132  
Upon a transfer to another federal penitentiary, Farmer was beaten and raped by 
another cell-mate.133  Farmer complained about his placement in the prison’s general 
population, despite the prison officials’ knowledge of his transsexualism and the 
vulnerability of attacks to which he would be subjected.134  Farmer alleged that these 
actions established deliberate indifference to his Eighth Amendment rights.135 
In applying the Estelle deliberate indifference test to Farmer’s mental disorder, 
the Court stated that deliberate indifference lies somewhere between the principles of 
negligence and purpose or knowledge.136  In defining the level of culpability required 
to establish deliberate indifference, the Court held it required a prison official to 
know of and disregard a substantial risk to the inmate’s health or safety.137  The 
prison official must both be aware of certain facts from which an inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must draw that inference from 
those facts.138  Where an official should have perceived a substantial risk but did not, 
liability is precluded.139  The Court explained that there must be an inquiry into the 
prison official’s state of mind when the inmate alleges that the official has inflicted 
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him with cruel and unusual punishment.140  Eighth Amendment claims against prison 
officials must satisfy a subjective requirement, as opposed to an objective 
requirement.141  The subjective standard to be applied to the inmates’ Eighth 
Amendment claims is the analogous subjective recklessness standard used in 
criminal law.142  A prison official may demonstrate his knowledge of a substantial 
risk through direct or circumstantial evidence presented to the fact finder.143  After 
Farmer, courts have used this standard to require actual knowledge of a risk, and if 
the official acted reasonably in response to a known risk, liability is precluded.   
Over the past several decades, inmates in correctional facilities have fought for 
their right to be provided the necessary medical care, and eventually this included a 
constitutional right to the necessary mental health care in certain situations.  Despite 
such rights to treatment, inmates face many barriers in obtaining the necessary 
mental health treatment for their illnesses.  Such barriers include understaffed and 
unqualified correctional staff, ineffective mental health screening procedures, lack of 
training for law enforcement officers, and the lack of collaboration between the 
criminal justice system and the mental health care system.  Though the judicial 
system has provided a greater access to mental health care, it has only done this 
reactively.  It is now time to proactively seek the proper amount of mental health 
care that a vast majority of persons incarcerated ultimately need. 
VI. BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT TREATMENT FOR MENTALLY ILL 
OFFENDERS 
In past decades, detailed guidelines have been established that illustrate the 
necessary components of mental health care in prisons and jails by the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), correctional mental health 
experts, court rulings, and private settlement agreements.144  In determining whether 
a particular correctional facility allows its inmates access to the necessary and 
adequate mental health care, a court should focus on several basic fundamental 
components that various courts and experts have said make up a constitutionally 
minimum mental health care system.145  Prisons must be equipped with the necessary 
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procedures for screening and identifying inmates with mental illnesses.146  The prison 
or jail must have various services for treating those with mental illnesses. Such 
services may include various therapeutic interventions or necessary medications.147  
Services also include methods and techniques for dealing with and treating suicidal 
inmates.  The prison must contain an appropriate number of mental health 
professionals to provide the necessary mental health care to the inmates.148  Facilities 
must also house adequate and confidential clinical records for the inmates.  Studies 
have shown that many correctional facilities around the country implement many of 
the various components suggested above, but no single facility implements every 
necessary component.149   
The initial screening or identification process utilized in correctional facilities is 
the first step in acquiring the necessary mental health care for mentally ill offenders.  
Under the subjective standard of Farmer, procedures such as screening or identifying 
inmates’ mental health disorders become even more crucial, because of the actual 
knowledge requirement.  When an inmate is initially screened upon intake at the 
correctional facility, mental health care professionals can identify which inmates 
suffer from mental illnesses and what illnesses they suffer from.  Absent an initial 
screening procedure, correctional officials may be immune under the standard of 
Farmer, because Farmer requires actual knowledge of the risk.  Untrained and 
unqualified correctional officers and staff are unable to actually know what mental 
disorders an inmate may suffer from, absent a medical diagnosis by a trained mental 
health professional.  
A. Correctional Facilities Must Implement Adequate Screening Procedures to 
Properly Identify Mentally Ill Offenders 
In 2000, nearly 95% of all state adult correctional facilities screened inmates for 
mental health problems, and of the nation’s 1,558 state public and private adult 
facilities, 1,394 reported that they provided mental health services to their inmates.150  
By midyear 2000, 13% of state prisoners were receiving some form of mental health 
therapy or counseling services, and nearly 10% of state prisoners were receiving 
psychotropic medications.151  The number of inmates receiving mental health care 
could be even higher if uniform screening and identifying procedures were 
implemented in all state and federal correctional facilities across the country.  
Despite such known statistics, the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado recently raised the very issue of a constitutional right to a full screening 
examination for inmates at intake.  The District Court stated that there is no 
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constitutional requirement that every person taken into custody receive a full 
physical examination to determine any present medical problems.152  Furthermore, 
the court stated that there was no requirement to hire a person to screen all persons 
coming into the jail to determine their mental and emotional status.153  The United 
States Supreme Court has not addressed this issue thus far, because the substantive 
issues of the case have not yet been argued in the District Court, but only the 
procedural issue of class certification.  At some time in the near future, the Court 
should address such conclusions made by the District Court and decide whether or 
not inmates have a constitutional right to receive a full physical examination to 
determine if any such mental or physical illnesses exist upon intake.  
One of the most crucial steps in attaining the proper mental health treatment for 
an inmate is through the initial screening and identification process.154  Inmates who 
fail to be identified as suffering from a mental illness when they are initially 
screened upon their entry into the jail or prison, will likely never receive the 
necessary treatment that they require.155  Inmates are often times placed in the 
general population as a result of this misclassification.  Segregation is often 
necessary for the safety of mentally ill inmates.  Inmates are usually screened upon 
their initial entry into a facility or upon a transfer, and this usually consists of a 
questionnaire.156  Through this short questionnaire, correctional personnel should be 
able to determine whether the inmate is in need of any mental health treatment, or 
whether a further evaluation is needed to determine the seriousness of the inmate’s 
mental illnesses.157  There is a caveat that self-reports do not always produce an 
accurate number, especially when dealing with mental illnesses.  Inmates may not 
even know that they are suffering from an illness or they may be embarrassed of 
admitting that they suffer from a mental illness.158  This emphasizes the need for 
implementing uniform assessment and screening tools in every correctional 
facility.159   
Even though the Michigan Bureau of Forensic Mental Health Services has 
implemented a comprehensive screening process, officials believe that they still fail 
to identify between six and eight serious mentally ill inmates per month.160  
However, the Michigan system is able to detect these inmates who fall through the 
cracks by using subsequent follow-up screening procedures. The system can also 
monitor the clinicians that failed to identify the specific inmates who suffered from a 
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mental illness.161  Some other states however are not as advanced as others. At the 
end of 2002, Alabama had barely begun to computerize any aspect of the mental 
health systems throughout their state correctional facilities.162  Likewise, in 
Wisconsin, a legislative audit conducted in 2001 found that the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections had no way of calculating the total number of serious 
mentally ill inmates contained in the state’s correctional facilities.163  
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ordered the 
Alabama State Prison System to incorporate some systematic procedure for 
identifying inmates with psychological deficiencies, drug or alcohol dependencies, 
and other substances abuses problems that the inmates may suffer from.164  Such 
systematic procedures must be administered by adequately trained medical or 
correctional personnel who are equipped with the knowledge and skills to identify 
the inmates’ need for mental health care.165  When inmates or pretrial detainees in 
need of mental health care are cast into the institutions’ general population, they are 
vulnerable to abuse from other inmates.166  Mentally ill offenders can often be placed 
in the general population if they are not screened by trained and qualified persons 
prior to their initial integration among other inmates.167  
The Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) was ordered to develop a 
systematic screening process for inmates to determine whether the incoming inmates 
had any legitimate medical or psychological needs.168  The court found that the 
correctional institution had little or no initial testing of the inmates subsequent to 
their placement in the institution.169  ISCI was ordered to implement a system where 
each inmate is evaluated upon his or her entry into the institution to determine if the 
inmate required any psychological treatment.170  
The district court concluded that a California prison’s failure to implement a 
systematic program for screening and evaluating inmates violated the Eighth 
Amendment.171  A county policy existed that required a “full-time clinical mental 
health worker at the [county] jail to perform screenings,” but constitutional 
violations arose when the county jail ceased the full-time mental health worker after 
disputes arose between the correctional facility and the mental health care 
provider.172 
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Once a court has determined that the institution has implemented a 
constitutionally sufficient screening or classification process, it will next look to the 
staff or persons conducting such screening or identifying procedures. 
B. Correctional Facilities Must Staff Adequately Trained Mental Health Care 
Professionals 
A court must determine whether there is a sufficient number of staff, or ratio of 
inmates to mental health care staff, conducting the necessary procedures, and that 
they are qualified to provide the essential care to the inmates.  A wide range of 
mental health professionals are needed in prisons and jails to provide the necessary 
mental health care to the inmates.173  Such professionals include: psychiatrists, 
psychologists, counselors, nurses, and recreational or occupational therapists.174 
In Ramos v. Lamm, inmates claimed that the prison mental health services were 
inadequate and violated their Eighth Amendment rights.175  Despite such high 
instances of inmates suffering from one form of mental illness or another, the prison 
had not one on-site psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to provide daily care for the 
mentally ill inmates.176  The court held that the facility’s omission to obtain the 
necessary treatment constituted deliberate indifference to the inmates’ serious mental 
health needs, and ordered the prison to employ at least one full-time psychiatrist.177  
Despite such an order, the Indiana State Prison had additional inadequacies present 
in its penal system.  
In Wellman v. Faulkner, the court held that the Indiana State Prison demonstrated 
“deliberate indifference [to the inmates’] serious medical needs” when the prison 
failed to provide an on-site psychiatrist to maintain continued treatment and deal 
with the inmates’ psychiatric problems.178  Even though the prison employed two 
part-time behavioral clinicians and one Ph.D. psychologist, the lack of an on-site 
psychiatrist or psychologist is a crucial piece to maintaining a constitutionally 
minimum level of adequate staffing to serve the needs of the institution’s mentally ill 
inmates.179  
In Cortes-Quiones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, the jury found that the Puerto Rico 
prison system demonstrated deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious psychiatric 
needs when the inmate was mutilated and murdered four months after his placement 
in the prison’s general population.180  The inmate was transferred to the Arecido 
District Jail following a riot at the state penitentiary.181  Even though the inmate’s 
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records revealed that he suffered from serious psychiatric disorders and that he 
required ongoing psychiatric treatment, his transfer was deemed an emergency due 
to the riot and his files arrived five days subsequent to his transfer.182  The jail’s 
superintendent was the only person present on the night of the transfer, but he was 
unqualified to make any evaluation of the inmate’s medical or psychological 
needs.183  Consequently, the inmate was never properly screened by an appropriate 
mental health care professional.  His psychiatric disorders went unidentified, and he 
was not properly segregated from the general population, which led to his eventual 
death.184  This illustrated the importance of adequately and accurately identifying 
those inmates who suffer from mental illnesses.  
The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota laid out what a 
constitutionally adequate system of staffing and care would include.185  Prior to the 
lawsuit, the South Dakota State Prison (SDSP) had only one psychiatrist whom the 
inmates had access to for treatment.186  The psychiatrist was not a full-time caregiver 
but a volunteer, and he worked at the prison one day a week for only five hours.187  
Treatments were limited to prescribing medications, brief counseling, follow-up 
examinations, and referrals.188  There was only one psychologist whose primary 
function was to screen and evaluate new inmates.189  The prison housed only two 
specialized mental health care providers, with only one of them a full-time 
position.190  The court found that such mental health staffing deficiency constituted 
deliberate indifference and was unconstitutional.191  
The court then discussed what a constitutionally sufficient staff should include. 
The inmates required acute (first level) and intermediate (second level) care from the 
prison that would include “twenty to twenty-five beds.”192  “Eight to ten of these 
beds would be devoted to psychiatric care” that required twenty-four hour nursing 
and support staff.193  Staffing would require a full-time psychiatrist, two full-time 
psychologists, approximately six nurses, full-time counselors or social workers to 
provide support, and the appropriate number of “correctional staff to provide twenty-
four hour security.”194  
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During a study done by the Human Rights Watch, where correctional officials 
and mental health experts were interviewed, all said that an adequate level of staffing 
is the single most important factor in providing good mental health services.195  The 
lack of funding is most often stated as the reason for inadequate levels of staffing.196 
As adequately trained mental health care professionals are required in correctional 
facilities, law enforcement officers must also be adequately trained to handle 
mentally ills persons whom they encounter, whether those persons are incarcerated 
or on the streets.  
C. Results of the Lack of Training for Law Enforcement Officers for Dealing with 
Mentally Ill Offenders 
Law enforcement officers are most often times the first persons that a mentally ill 
offender comes in contact with before they formally enter the criminal justice 
system.  Many law enforcement officers are untrained or unqualified to handle 
mentally ill offenders.197  A police officer is often left without the proper training to 
attend to a person suffering from a mental illness, while a mental health clinician is 
often unqualified to handle a mentally ill person who demonstrates criminal behavior 
in the outside world.  Sheriff Sexton testified to Congress that a rise in these types of 
instances is due to the decline in large mental institutions that were once equipped 
and able to handle mentally ill persons. 
This decline resulted in many mentally ill persons resorting to homelessness, 
which often led to low-level criminal activity, because they were now left without 
the proper treatment to their mental illnesses.198  Because law enforcement officers 
are the first lines of defense when dealing with mentally ill offenders, there is a great 
need to properly train law enforcement officers to handle criminal situations that 
involve mentally ill offenders.199  Law enforcement officers must be able to 
understand the offender, and how the illness may affect that person in that particular 
situation.  Sheriff Sexton and his senior staff have set out a program to effectively 
train law enforcement officers in handling mentally ill offenders.  Such training is 
not just limited to patrol officers, who may come in contact with a mentally ill 
offender most often, but provides this training to other law enforcement agencies, 
fire/ rescue squads, EMTs, and volunteer fire departments.  This program will serve 
as a pilot program and will be eventually implemented statewide.200   
VII. PROBLEMS THAT RESULT FOR THE FAILURE TO PROPERLY TREAT MENTALLY ILL 
OFFENDERS 
As a result of the rapid period of deinstitutionalization during the 1950s, ’60s, 
and ‘70s, many offenders were unable to quickly adjust to the outside world upon 
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their release.201  Absent these basic living skills necessary to function on their own, 
traditional psychiatric treatment was likely unsuccessful.202 
A. Lack of Treatment in Correctional Facilities for Mentally Ill Offenders 
The main concern involving those offenders with mental illnesses is when they 
commit less-serious or low-level crimes that often do not require lengthy 
sentences.203  Persons who commit less-serious crimes often remain in jail for short 
periods of time, if any time at all.204  Offenders who suffer from mental illnesses will 
often not receive any treatment for their mental illnesses while incarcerated in local 
jails prior to their release back into the community, because of the short period of 
incarceration and opportunity to seek proper treatment.  Treatment is often reserved 
to those individuals serving larger sentences, usually in state or federal prisons.205  
State and local governments must develop programs and policies that are 
individualized to their system’s and inmates’ needs to respond to the demanding 
problems that managing mentally ill offenders and the increasing costs to provide 
such programs to these offenders across all levels of incarceration.206  
One study indicated that there are multiple problems and hurdles that correctional 
facilities face when attempting to provide mentally ill offenders with the appropriate 
treatments.207  Such barriers to an effective mental health treatment program included 
the correctional environment, the lack of coordination with other prison staff and 
services, mental health staff training and support, and the lack of adequate fiscal 
resources.208  Many prisons lack the appropriate levels of mental health care services 
and the separate space that is required to treat the mentally ill inmates.209  The lack of 
financial resources affects areas such as the inability to provide adequate treatment 
programs to every inmate that requires participation, the effects of fatigue and 
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burnout to the understaffed facilities, and the failure to quickly integrate the 
necessary training and education of the correctional staff to the needs of the mentally 
ill inmates.210  Financial shortcomings result in a substantial number of inmates who 
require various types of mental health treatment, but are unable to receive the 
necessary care.211 
Some mental health experts have said that excessive periods of 
institutionalization or hospitalization can often decrease an offender’s chance of a 
positive return to society upon his or her release.212  The problem most often related 
to releasing mentally ill offenders is the lack of treatment that they receive while 
incarcerated prior to their release.  If their mental illnesses are related to their 
criminal behavior, the lack of treatment for their mental illnesses may likely result in 
high levels of recidivism. 
B. Recidivism Rates Among Mentally Ill Offenders Upon Their Release 
Offenders with mental illnesses report extremely high rates of recidivism; 
therefore, the cycle continues for most mentally ill offenders.213  The criminal justice 
system acts as a “revolving door” to these offenders, who constantly move in and out 
of jail and the community.  According to a study, more than 70% of the mentally ill 
offenders who were released from the Lucas County Jail in Lucas County, Ohio, 
were re-arrested within a three-year period.214  A second study showed that 90% of 
the mentally ill inmates in the Los Angeles County Jail were repeat offenders, and 
nearly 10% of those mentally ill offenders had been incarcerated on ten or more 
instances.215  Mentally ill offenders must be afforded the proper treatment to some 
how cease their criminal behavior.216  How could the criminal behavior cease, when 
the likely cause of the behavior is ignored, rather than treated?  Correctional facilities 
must be adequately equipped with the resources to properly treat mentally ill 
offenders. Such resources start with the proper allocation of money to fund such 
treatment programs.  
VIII. PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS RECEIVE THE 
NECESSARY MENTAL HEALTH CARE TREATMENT WHILE INCARCERATED 
On any given day in the United States, there are over one million individuals 
under the supervision of the criminal justice system who suffer from a serious mental 
illness.217  Judge William Wayne Justice expressed concern for mentally ill offenders 
when he stated,   
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It is deplorable and outrageous that this state’s prisons appear to have 
become a repository for a great number of its mentally ill citizens.  
Persons who, with psychiatric care, could fit well into society, are instead 
locked away, to become wards of the state’s penal system.  Then, in a 
tragically ironic twist, they may be confined in conditions that nurture, 
rather than abate, their psychoses.218 
Despite the high number of mentally ill offenders incarcerated in the United 
States, only one-third of men and one-quarter of women who suffer from a mental 
illness reported they received treatment while detained in jail.219   
A. The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 
In the summer of 2003, each Chamber of Congress introduced nearly identical 
bills designed to encourage local collaborations which would ensure that resources 
are effectively and efficiently used within the criminal justice, juvenile justice, and 
mental health systems.220  Each bill was designed to be an amendment to Title I of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3711 et 
seq.).221  The bills sought to provide grant funding to state and local government 
agencies to implement programs and strategies aimed at solving the modern 
problems that such agencies deal with concerning criminals, mental health illnesses, 
and substance abuse problems.222  Such agencies would not only help adult 
offenders, but juveniles as well.  Many of these juveniles become the same adults 
who enter the criminal justice system later on in life.  
The majority of individuals with a mental illness or emotional disorder who are 
involved in the criminal or juvenile justice systems are responsive to medical and 
psychological interventions that integrate treatment, rehabilitation, and support.223  
Collaborative programs between mental health, substance abuse, and criminal or 
juvenile justice systems that ensure the requirement of services for those with mental 
illness or co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse disorders can reduce the 
number of such individuals in adult and juvenile corrections facilities, while 
providing improved public safety.224 
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On October 21, 2004, President George W. Bush signed the Mentally Ill 
Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 into law.225  The purpose of 
this bill “is to increase public safety by facilitating collaboration among criminal 
justice, juvenile justice, mental health treatment, and substance abuse systems.” 226  
Such collaboration is needed to reduce re-arrests among adult and juveniles with 
mental illnesses and substance abuse problems.227  Courts, including mental health 
courts, must be provided with the appropriate treatment options for those suffering 
from mental illnesses and substance abuse problems, and to maximize their use of 
alternative diversions from prosecution of non-violent offenders.228  The criminal 
justice system must promote adequate training of their personnel concerning mental 
illnesses and substance abuse disorders, which they may have little knowledge 
and/or experience dealing with.229  On the other hand, mental health personnel must 
be informed about adequate training for handling criminals who suffer from mental 
illnesses.230  Finally, and most importantly, there must be adequate levels of 
communication between all support systems (criminal and juvenile justice, mental 
health, and substance abuse), and between all levels of government.231  
Congress has found that a bill of this type has proved to be of great importance to 
this country through its several findings dealing with the overwhelming number of 
mentally ill offenders.232  Through the many hearings, Congress found that over 16% 
of adults incarcerated in United States jails and prisons have a mental illness.233 
Approximately 20% of youth in the juvenile justice system have serious mental 
health problems, and many have co-occurring mental health and substance abuse 
disorders.  Up to 40% of adults who suffer from serious mental illness will come into 
contact with the American criminal justice system at some point in their lives.234 
Over 150,000 juveniles who come in contact with the juvenile justice system each 
year meet the diagnostic criteria for at least one mental or emotional disorder. A 
significant number of adults with a serious mental illness who are involved with the 
criminal justice system are homeless or at imminent risk of homelessness.235 
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This legislation is necessary to provide the resources to effectively divert 
offenders away from jails and prisons and into the appropriate treatment programs. 
But is this enough? Government agencies, local law enforcement agencies, and 
mental health care providers must now proactively seek the available funds and 
provide the necessary care to those suffering from mental illnesses.236  One study has 
shown that when the proper amounts of resources are allocated and individuals 
receive the proper amount of mental health treatment, those individuals have lower 
recidivism rates than those individuals who receive inadequate amounts of mental 
health treatment.  
B. Properly Implemented Treatment Programs in Correctional Facilities Can Lower 
Recidivism Rates for Mentally Il Offenders 
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study considered over 1,000 people 
who had been hospitalized for various mental illnesses, and looked at the effect of 
the various levels of treatment given to the particular groups of offenders.237  The 
study compared three groups by administering different levels of treatment and then 
comparing their levels of violence.  The study attempted to determine whether the 
appropriate level of treatment was in any way related to the offender’s risk of violent 
behavior.238  Of the group who received no treatment, medication or therapy, 
subsequent to their release from the hospital, 14 percent soon reported acts of 
violence.  The group that received inadequate levels of treatment, meaning some 
treatment but not the necessary levels they need, had a reduced rate of violent acts, 
from 14 percent to about 9 percent.  However, the group that received the 
appropriate levels of treatment necessary to combat their mental illnesses had a rate 
of violence that was reduced from 14 percent to less than 3 percent.239  Therefore, the 
study found that offenders who received the appropriate levels of mental health 
treatment were less likely than those not receiving the treatment to commit an act of 
violence upon their release into the community.240 
The above study illustrates that when mentally ill offenders are given the proper 
amounts of mental health treatment, their recidivism rates decrease significantly.  
The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 will now 
fund the necessary treatment that so many mentally ill offenders require.  Without 
the proper treatment and funds to provide for such treatment programs, the problem 
of mentally ill offenders will continue to grow.  Federal, state, and local governments 
who were previously fiscally restrained from providing the necessary mental health 
care to its inmates may now be provided with the adequate resources to provide for 
the necessary treatment.  Each discipline, however, cannot combat this problem 
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alone, but they work together, combining their strengths, to provide a brighter 
tomorrow for mentally ill offenders, and a safer community for its citizens.  
C. Collaboration Between Systems to Combat the Barriers Affecting the Treatment of 
Mentally Ill Offenders 
One of the most important factors that the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and 
Crime Reductions Act stressed was collaboration. Collaboration between the various 
disciplines is a key ingredient to the success of this legislation.  Mental health 
professionals must come to grasps with the reality that mentally ill offenders are as 
much their responsibility as they are the responsibility of the criminal justice 
system.241  
Collaboration between the criminal justice system and the mental health system 
may decrease the rates of incarceration for mentally ill offenders, and may be a 
significant benefit for both systems, as they can learn from each other in dealing with 
mentally ill offenders.242  State and local governments must encourage their police 
departments to develop crisis intervention teams and pretrial screening procedures 
for defendants and newly admitted inmates with mental illnesses.  Local court 
systems must establish mental health courts that are specialized to treat the 
offenders’ mental illnesses that are inevitably causing the offenders to commit crime.  
Probation officers must be given a specialized caseload that deal strictly with 
mentally ill offenders, and work with multidisciplinary teams to develop the inmates’ 
re-entry planning.  Correctional facilities and mental health care providers must 
establish a therapeutic community offenders program with co-occurring substance 
abuse and mental health disorders.243  No single agency or discipline can solve the 
ongoing problem of dealing with mentally ill offenders; therefore, only working 
together by involving all disciplines can begin to solve the problem.244  As the 
various disciplines begin to work with one another, there is a need for new and 
continuous training so that each discipline can truly understand the mentally ill 
offender.  
D. Law Enforcement Agencies Must Be Trained to Deal with Mentally Ill Offenders 
Sheriff Ted Sexton also testified to Congress about his concern about the lack of 
training that law enforcement officers receive on how to handle the mentally ill 
offender.245  A majority of offenders who suffer from mental illnesses are non-
violent, low-level criminals who show a continued pattern of criminal behavior as 
their mental illnesses go untreated.246  Many calls that his department receives are 
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from family members who are concerned for their loved ones suffering from mental 
illnesses, who may be posing a risk to them.247  Individuals may be posing a risk as a 
result of certain circumstances that the person is faced with, or that they have not 
taken their prescribed medication and their behavior is altered as a result.248  
Senator John Campbell of Vermont, a former police officer and attorney, testified 
to Congress due to the same concerns as Sheriff Ted Sexton.249  As a former police 
officer, he encountered many situations that involved less-serious crimes committed 
by persons that appeared to be suffering from mental illnesses.250  He was qualified 
to handle the criminal aspect of the situation, but was unqualified to handle the 
mental health aspect.  Often times, the individual is in need of mental health or 
substance abuse treatment, but resources were scarce and unavailable to provide the 
necessary treatment.251  Police officers are unable to act as quasi-mental health care 
providers, and this places an unreasonable burden upon them.252  
The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 will 
provide police departments, correctional facilities, mental health providers, and 
various other agencies and disciplines the necessary training on how to deal with 
situations that involve mentally ill offenders.  As illustrated above, without the 
necessary training, situations cannot be dealt in the most effective manner.  This Act 
will provide these agencies and disciplines the necessary funding to begin combating 
the problem in the most efficient and fiscally responsible manner.  
E. Alternatives to Incarceration for Mentally Ill Offenders 
Besides the need to train law enforcement agencies to effectively handle 
individuals with mental illnesses, there is a need to utilize the available alternatives 
and implement them to the current plans of action.253  In instances when mentally ill 
offenders are more of a disturbance than a threat to society, the choices are to take 
the person to jail, or to leave them at the scene.254  Either way, the person likely will 
not receive the necessary treatment that he or she ultimately requires.  If the person is 
left where the police originally found the person, it will be a matter of time until the 
police are again summoned to deal with the same person.  On the other hand, if the 
person is taken to jail following the incident or after a continued pattern of criminal 
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behavior, the county jail will often be ill-equipped to handle the person as well, and 
again, nothing is accomplished.255  
Mental health courts have been implemented in various cities to provide an 
alternative to those offenders who suffer from mental illnesses.256  One such court 
exists in Broward County, Florida, where mentally ill offenders who commit 
misdemeanor offenses are offered the choice to accept mental health treatment in the 
community or to have their cases proceed, which likely will lead to jail time.257  
Nearly 95 percent of the offenders choose to receive mental health treatment in the 
community.258  These offenders are twice more likely to receive treatment than 
offenders in other counties that do not have mental health courts.  When offenders 
choose to accept mental health treatment, their jail sentences are most often reduced, 
saying valuable tax dollars.  However, there is no one way to successfully divert 
mentally ill offenders away from jail, and each program must be unique to the needs 
and resources of the community.259 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In the last three to four decades, federal courts have seen an influx of lawsuits 
involving a correctional facility’s denial of adequate levels of mental health care.  
However, past decisions, such as Estelle and Farmer have led courts to reactively 
amend the problems that mentally ill offenders face each day while they are 
incarcerated.  Courts have only amended these inadequate levels of treatment when 
they were so egregious that the courts had no choice but to demand the 
implementation of mental health care treatment.  Correctional facilities house a 
substantial percentage of offenders who require various types of mental health care 
treatment, but the fact is that many correctional facilities still remain ill-equipped to 
handle these offenders’ mental health needs. 
Although the number of mentally ill offenders who are incarcerated in this 
country are astounding, the continued practice to allow such offenders to go 
untreated is just plain unacceptable.  As mentally ill offenders continue to be 
incarcerated without affording them the proper mental health care treatment, their 
problems will continue to increase.  Many of the mental illnesses that offenders 
struggle with are often the causes of their incarceration or continued acts of 
disorderly conduct.  If mentally ill offenders were given the appropriate levels of 
treatment they require, their levels of incarceration and rates of recidivism will likely 
decline as a result.  And when their levels of incarceration and rates of recidivism 
decrease, valuable tax dollars could be saved and applied to other areas of 
governmental need. 
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The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study has shown that when mentally 
ill offenders are given the appropriate levels of treatment that they require, their 
recidivism rates have decreased significantly.260  Further studies seek to find the 
same results, which are when you fix what is broken, the reoccurring problems will 
cease to exist. Affording mentally ill offenders the appropriate levels of treatment 
encompasses the idea of proactive implementation.  Courts can only address or 
amend already inadequate levels of treatment or the complete denial of sufficient 
mental health care treatment for incarcerated mentally ill offenders.  That is, courts 
can only react to the egregious actions towards mentally ill offenders.  Government 
agencies and private mental health care providers must begin to work proactively to 
combat this problem.  
The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004 is one of 
the first proactive pieces of legislation that can truly make a difference in solving the 
problem that this country faces in dealing with mentally ill offenders.  This 
legislation seeks to encourage various federal, state, and local government agencies, 
as well as private mental health and substance abuse providers, to proactively seek 
solutions to allow mentally ill offenders the access to the necessary treatment.  
Rhonda Atkins’ daughter could have been saved years ago if legislation like the 
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act had been implemented 
sooner.  The time has come when society must address this immense problem that 
mentally ill offenders are creating.  If Rhonda’s daughter was suffering from a cold, 
she could have been taken to her family doctor for the proper treatment.  Mental 
disorders are not as curable as a cold, but they do require some level of affirmative 
action, rather than no action at all.  For years, there has been exactly that, no action 
towards attaining the necessary mental health treatment that so many mentally ill 
offenders require.  Only time will tell how legislation and others alike will help 
combat the problem of the thousands of mentally ill offenders entering and 
remaining in the criminal justice system each year.  
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